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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
On any given day, we make countless judgments about the behavior of those ai'ound us.
Are they acceptable or unacceptable, good or bad, moral or immoral? We rarely spend
time pondering our decisions and often base our behaviors on the judgments we make.
These immediate and automatic judgments provide us with a much-needed social
compass that allows us to navigate through our day-to-day lives. We are able to use
information about others' morality to help us decide those we should trust, those we
should help and, most importantly, those we should avoid. As many have pointed out, by
doing so we are able to preserve group cohesion. We are able to decide which members
of the group deserve to remain within the group and who needs to be isolated for the
greater good of the group (De Waal, 1996, 2003, Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2006).
Nowhere is this more apparent than when it comes to our strong moral attitudes.
Studies on morality have also shown evidence of discrimination against people who hold
opposite moral attitudes (Mullen & Skitka, 2006). Not only do individuals who violate
our moral codes elicit reactions of negative affect, but the behaviors that are elicited are
characterized by intolerance for these people. Evidence of intolerance of others who
violate our moral codes is clear in studies conducted in the realm of the moral mandate
effect. Moral mandates are strong moral convictions that are different from other strong
attitudes (Mullen & Skitka, 2006). Studies on the moral mandate effect show that when
individuals create social relationships, it is with others who have similar moral mandates,
and when they find out that another individual has beliefs that violate their own moral
mandates, they show intolerance of the other and create more social distance from the
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other (Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005). Furthermore, these studies also show that when
groups of individuals who are heterogeneous in moral mandates are asked to come up
with a procedure to solve a problem, the discussion is often chai-acterized by hostility,
tension and defensiveness. Participants in the morally heterogeneous groups also report
more dissatisfaction and unhappiness with the group and the discussion (Skitka. et at.,
2005).
Moral Judgments
Psychologists have tried to describe the processes and mechanisms that ai'e behind
the moral judgments that we make. The explanations provided by psychologists like
Piaget and Kohlberg (1981 & 1984) are based on a rational cognitive model; suggesting
that the moral decisions of people are the result of moral reasoning that develops as a part
ofhuman development. The rational model of morality conceptualizes morality as being
created by the child attempting to understand the world around him or her (Kohlberg,
1981 & 1984; Piaget as cited by Haidt & Bjorklund, 2006). Most fiindamentally, this
rational model proposes that morality is universally motivated by rational deliberative
reasoning. The process begins with the individual facing a dilemma. In response to the
dilemma, the individual will engage in deliberative reasoning, weigh aspects of the
situation and respond in an appropriate manner. With the acceptance of the role of
automacity in a wide range ofhuman behavior (see, e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1996), this
rational model of morality has begun to be questioned.
A ftindamental critique of the rationalist model of morality, represented by the
social intuitionist model (see Haidt, 2001), involves the mental processing of moral
judgments. The rationalist model postulates that individual moral reasoning takes place as
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a result of an eliciting event acting upon both affect and reasoning simultaneously, that
then leads to moral judgment. Therefore, the model also proposes that if aigument and
logic are employed, it should be readily possible to change another individual's moral
reasoning (Haidt, 2001). However, Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model puiports a
different process of moral "reasoning." The process begins with the same eliciting event.
However, in this particular model the event's effects are felt first in the individual's
intuition and affect, which then leads to moral behavior and is followed by post hoc
reasoning to explain one's response (Haidt, 2001).
The Haidt social intuitionist model has sparked considerable interest. The new
approach has been best illustrated by the phenomenon of moral dumfounding (Haidt,
2001). Haidt and his colleagues studied participants' responses to a wide range of
situations that would be generally deemed moral dilemmas. The studies included
scenarios such as a consensual incestual relationship between two adult sibhngs, using a
chicken carcass for sexual gratification that you may eat later, and using the national flag
to clean the toilet (Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993). They argued that their participants'
unfavorable reactions were not a result of deliberative and rational moral reasoning, but
an automatic emotional response to what they were reading. They further claimed
participants would follow these reactions with reasoning that was essentially used to
justify the manner in which they had responded to the scenarios (Shweder & Haidt,
1994). Reading the scenarios seemed to cause emotional arousal in the participants. Their
explanations for their reactions appeared to follow later (Haidt, 2001), and in many cases
the participants were "dumbfounded," in that they struggled to explain their responses.
Haidt argues that this represents how cognitive processing takes place when an individual
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is faced with making a moral judgment. The initial automatic reaction or intuition of the
individual is largely based on emotion and then reasoning is used to make sense of the
"judgment" that he or she has already made.
Dual Process Theories
This question ofhow responses differ based on the type of cognitive processing
used has been addressed by dual process theories in psychology. Such theories have
become central in many domains of social psychology, from attitudes to stereotyping to
group processes (for a review, see Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Basically, two distinct modes
of information processing are distinguished: automatic versus controlled processing.
The basic principle of these theories is that all information processing is the result
of the rational controlled processing system or the automatic processing system.
Automatic processing is identified as a bottom-up system where the response to
information comes first (Moskowitz, Skumik & Galinsky, 1999). Automatic cognitive
processes are thought to be involuntary, autonomous, and effortless and do not need the
doer to expend energy on the processing of information. In this case, activity is initiated
by cues in the environment or in the situation (Moskowitz et. al., 1999).
On the other hand, controlled processing involves much more attention on the part
of the actor. It involves top-down processing where all information is taken into
consideration in deciding on a response. The actor is conscious of the information that is
presented by the environment and expends mental energy in trying to organize and make
sense of that information. Therefore, in controlled processing, rather than being merely
prompted by the environment, the actor becomes an active agent (Moskowitz et. al,
1999). In the realm of morality, this is similar to what had been proposed by Kohlberg,
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while the intuition that is an integral part of Haidt's model seems to be driven by
automatic processing.
Psychologists have looked at several different phenomena using dual process
theories. In the area of persuasion, the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty &
Cacciopo, 1984) gives a glimpse of how the two systems, the automatic and the
deliberative, work in attitude change. In the many studies that were conducted using this
framework, it was found that central (rational, deliberative) versus peripheral (automatic)
processing interacted with several variables such as the expertise of the person and the
strength of the argument in leading to attitude change (Petty & Wegener, 1999). For
example, Petty and Cacciopo (1984) found that when a person likes the source of a
message, then the person comes to a more automatic judgment about the message, that is
being presented and will be more susceptible to persuasion. Similarly, when the stakes
are low and the message being presented is of low value to the person, then too, a more
automatic response will occur. However, when the person has little confidence about his
or her ability to process the information or is highly motivated then he or she may resort
to more careful deliberative processing (Petty and Cacciopo, 1984). Other studies have
shown that in cases where people have emotion-based automatic responses, once they are
asked to think carefully about the fact that their judgments may be biased by emotion,
people do correct for these biases (Ottati & Isbell, 1996).
Studies have found that using either automatic or controlled processing has an
impact on a wide range ofjudgments and behaviors. Automatic cognitive processing has
been linked to many cognitive biases (Lemer & Goldberg, 1999). In addition, more
recent work on implicit stereotyping builds on the idea of automatic responses to
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environmental stimuli (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Among the many studies conducted
on implicit attitudes, there has been much evidence of negative automatic attitudes
towards a wide range of different groups in the U.S., including African
Americans/Blacks, homosexuals and AIDS patients. Furthermore, it has been found that
these implicit attitudes are often better predictors than explicit self-report measures of
how people behave towards members of the other group (Dasgupta, 2004). It appears that
the automatic attitudes are in some sense "corrected" for when participants respond to
explicit self-report measures, which involve more deliberative processing.
As in many of these studies, what many scholars in the area of morality have
found is that both automatic and deliberative processes are involved in moral reasoning.
As in the moral dumbfounding experiments, researchers have found evidence supporting
Haidt's intuitionist claims. Thus, studies using standard hypotheticals largely derived
from the work of moral philosophy have shown the automatic nature of many moral
judgments. In particular, the many studies conducted using the trolley versus footbridge
dilemmas have found very clear differences in how people respond to turning the switch
vs. pushing someone onto the tracks (e.g. Greene & Haidt, 2002). It is clear that the
majority of participants have an automatic negative response to pushing a person off the
footbridge to stop the train, whereas they react more favorably to turning a switch to
achieve the same end. The fact that in both cases a man does die as a direct result of the
action does not seem to make a difference. Interestingly, the participants are unable to
explain the reasons for their choices (Greene & Haidt, 2002, Greene, Nystrom, Engell,
Darley & Cohen, 2004).
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However, while these studies speak to the importance of the automatic process in
moral judgments, so far there has been no research that specifically looks at the function
of these two systems in the area of morality. More specifically, there has been no study
that has looked at the differences in moral judgments based on automatic versus
deliberative information processing. Taking into consideration the robust findings in dual
process theories, we hypothesized that moral judgments are indeed made as automatic
responses to information, but that these moral judgments may look different when
participants are provided with an opportunity to rationally deliberate about these
judgments.
Intergroup bias
The literature on stereotyping and dual process approaches also speaks to how
individuals outside our group boundaries are often viewed more negatively as a result of
automatic processing. This leads to the question of how the dual processes might function
when moral judgments are made about others of different groups. The area of intergroup
bias has contributed towards an understanding of how members of different groups are
treated in a wide variety of situations (Frey & Tropp, 2006, Hewstone, Rubin and Willis,
2002). However, the role of moral judgments in the intergroup context has received little
attention thus far.
Some of the earliest research on intergroup bias was Tajfel and Turner's (e.g.,
1986 & Turner, 1987) studies using the minimal group paradigm. These researchers
found that when asked to distribute resoui'ces, participants often favored members of their
own group even when the groups were randomly created in the laboratory (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986, Turner, 1987). There have been numerous studies that
have followed these
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initial investigations showing the more intricate workings of the phenomenon and
supporting the ingroup favoritism effect. In studies
,
it has been shown that not all groups
are treated in the same manner. Reactions to outgroups can range from mild neutral
feelings to severe negative emotions like anger, contempt and disgust (Brewer, 1999).
While in most instances when asked to distribute resources individuals exhibit intergroup
bias, when asked to mete out punishment, this effect is much less clear-cut. In other
words, when individuals were asked to punish a member of an outgroup, there was little
difference in the levels of punishment given to ingroup as opposed to outgroup members
(Hewstone et al, 2002).
Therefore, in an exploratory attempt, the current study looked at the moral
judgments in an intergroup context and focused on the impact of automatic and
deliberative processing on intergroup biases. Two tentative hypotheses were tested:
Whether an outgroup member would be judged more harshly in the automatic condition,
and whether there would be less correction of the automatic response for outgroup than
ingroup members in the deliberative condition.
For this particular study, we chose a behavior that is clearly immoral but which is
also prevalent among college students in the US: plagiarism. The technology available to
college students has made it easier to engage in such behavior. There is a booming
market for term papers and other material that can be bought online and then passed off
as one's own work. A survey conducted in 21 colleges across the US by the Center for
Academic Integrity of Duke University in 1999 found that two thirds of the 2100
participants surveyed had indulged in some form of plagiarism (Muha, 2000). Since then,
the problem has only gotten worse with the greater accessibility of the Internet. A
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nationwide study conducted at Rutgers University found that 54% percent of students
admitted to plagiarizing from the Internet and 74% admitted to having engaged in some
serious cheating at least once in the school year (Strichez, 2001). Furthermore, statistics
from our own university show the prevalence of plagiarism. In an academic dishonesty
attitudes survey conducted in the spring of 2006 with UMass, Amherst undergraduates,
the majority of students strongly disapproved of academic dishonesty (54.2%). When
asked whether they had personally submitted the work of someone else as their own, 95%
of the participants reported that they had never done this. When asked if they have ever
submitted a paper they purchased online, 96% of participants say they had never done
this. Interestingly, however, when asked if they knew of an instance when friends had
submitted a paper that was not their own work, 21% said they did, and in addition 20% of
the students admitted to having copied a few sentences from a source that they found
online without citing it in their paper.
We believed that in general participants would judge plagiarism to be wrong.
However, we predicted that in the automatic condition plagiarism would be judged more
harshly than in the deliberative and the control conditions (the control condition also
allowed for controlled, deliberative processing, although this was not made an explicit
part of the instructions). This was based on students' familiarity with plagiarism and the
likelihood that they might be expected to correct for their initial gut reactions, especially
in the case of fellow students.
In summary, this study used standard, accepted methods developed by
psychologists to study dual process models. The automatic condition involved cognitive
overload, whereby participants were essentially unable to engage in effortful processing.
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In the dehberative processing condition participants were asked to specifically spend time
deliberating about their responses. We also manipulated group membership via ethnic
identity: White versus Arab-American. The main hypotheses in this study were that the
target would be judged more harshly in the automatic condition than in the deliberative
condition. This would be due to some correction in the initial judgment when asked to
engage in more deliberative processing. Furthermore, we tested for an exploratory
hypothesis regarding group membership differences. We believed that across the
conditions, an outgroup member's behavior would be judged more harshly than an
ingroup member's behavior. We therefore expected more negative judgments of the
ourgroup member in the automatic condition and less correction in the deliberative
condition as well.
Method
The study was conducted as a 2 (ingroup, outgroup) X 3 (automatic condition,
deliberative condition, and control condition) between-subjects experiment.
Participants
Participants were recruited through the Experimentrak system in the Psychology
Department at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. A total 206 participants took
part in the experiment. No monetary compensation was available, but participants were
awarded credit towards a class of their choosing in return for taking part in the study.
Our sample consisted of 57 male and 149 female students (28% and 72% of the
sample, respectively). These participants ranged in age from 18 to 31 years. The majority
of participants were White (173 or 84% of the sample), but the sample also included five
African-Americans, nine Asian-Americans and seven Hispanics/ Latinos. Seven
10
participants were dropped from the analysis for not following instructions (see below).
The initial data analysis was conducted omitting African-Americans, Asian-Americans
and Hispanics/Latinos, but it was found that the results did not change when the data
were reanalyzed including these participants. Therefore, the following analyses were
based on the complete data set. The same was done for outliers. Outliers were identified
based on the relationship between the cognitive processing condition and all main
variables. They were included in the analyses since they did not make a difference in the
results.
Materials
Participants were told that they were taking part in a nationwide study
investigating attitudes towards plagiarism. Each participant was provided with a folder
(see Appendix 1) that was supposedly the case file of a student who was suspected of
plagiarism. The development of all stimulus materials for the study was based on a real
case of plagiarism (with all identifying information removed) provided by the UMass
campus ombudsperson's office. The cover sheet provided the student's name and student
number, which were blacked out supposedly to protect the student's identity, class
information and subject, the name of the complainant (crossed out), the nature of the
complaint and whether the student had been previously charged with any similar
misconduct (no). Background information about the student included the manipulation of
ingroup/outgroup status (race/ethnicity: White versus Arab-American), as discussed
below.
The complaint was that parts of the final paper submitted for the class had been
copied from already published work. The student in his appeal admitted that the paper
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was plagiarized but said that he did not do it purposely and that he had found xeroxed
material in a library book he had used. The student also described himself as a hard-
working student who had still not declared a major and who works off-campus to help
pay for college. The file also contained vei7 lengthy excerpts from the said paper and the
published material (see Appendix 1).
In addition, the file contained passages from two reference letters, presumably
from two individuals providing character references for the student. The letter for the
outgroup Arab-American student was from the head of the Islamic school where the
student was involved as a volunteer tutor. This particular letter was used to reinforce the
manipulation of ingroup/outgroup status. The second letter was from the president of an
on-campus student organization. This was used to create ambiguity about the student.
This letter stated that the student had been involved in protests against the state
government to prevent tuition increases at his college. The same information was
provided for the ingroup, White American student, who was also a volunteer tutor in an
area school (letter provided from principal) and had also been involved in protests against
the state government to prevent tuition hikes.
After reading through the materials in the folder, participants were asked to
complete several items that assessed the morality or immorality of the target and target's
conduct. The target's behavior was assessed using an 8-item bipolar scale that included
items such as immoral-moral, bad-good, inexcusable-excusable. The items were
constructed as 7-point rating scales (see Appendix 1). Reliability analyses found that the
very last item on the scale, uncommon-common, did not fit with the others (i.e.,
substantially reduced scale rehability) and therefore was eliminated from the scale. The
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other seven items were combined and averaged to create the Behavior Scale (a = .90). An
Exploratory Factor Analysis showed that these seven items loaded on one scale.
The scale items related to the target were constructed to capture the perceived
warmth, competence and morality of the target (see Appendix 1). An Exploratory Factor
Analysis showed that these items loaded on thi-ee separate scales as expected. Like the
earher scale, the items were assessed on a 7-point rating scale and were anchored with
adjectives including incompetent-competent, unfriendly-friendly and bad-good (see
Appendix 1). The items incompetent-competent, unskillful-skillful, unconfident-
confident and unintelligent-intelligent were combined to create the Competence subscale
(a = .79). The items unsociable-sociable, bad natured-good natured, unfriendly-friendly
and cold-warm were combined to create the Warmth subscale (a = .80). And the items
untrustworthy-trustworthy, ill intentioned-well intentioned, immoral-moral and
dishonest-honest were combined to create the Morality subscale (a = .87).
Participants were also asked to judge the guilt/innocence of the target and to make
an appropriate recommendation in response to the plagiarism charge. The possible
punishments were chosen out of eight options. They were scored 1 = "no action at all,
student should receive no punishment" to 8 = "the student should be expelled from
school and not allowed to return." The other six options were re-writing the paper and
having the new grade count, re-writing the paper and having the new grade and an "F'
averaged, receiving an F for the paper with no re-write option, failing the course,
suspension for a semester and suspension for a year. Punishment scores therefore ranged
from 1 to 8 from the most lenient to the hai'shest. Participants were also asked to rate the
fairness/unfairness of each of these punishments. For this particular scale participants
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were asked to rate each punishment as being either unfair because it was too easy
(anchored by
-3) or unfair because it was too harsh (anchored by 3). The midpoint was 0,
which was "fair." These, together with the morahty items, served as the main dependent
measures for the study.
Participants were also asked to complete the Social Dominance Scale (Sidanius &
Pratto, 1994), which served as a measure of a participant's attitudes towards equality
among groups (a = .85). Next, participants were asked to complete a demographic
questionnaire. Finally, participants were asked to respond to a questionnaire that was a
manipulation test to ensure that the participants had paid attention to the information they
had been reading. They were asked to identify the target's gender and ethnicity and were
also asked to write down the professional positions of the two persons who had provided
the character references for the student. In addition, this questionnaire also included an
adaptation of the PANAS scale (positive affect subscale, a = .83 and the negative affect
subscale a = .85) which was analyzed to make sure that the participants' responses were
not a reflection of emotions that were aroused while reading the material. The Social
Dominance Orientation Scale and the PANAS were found not to be correlated to any of
the other measures and also no significant effect when used in an MANOVA and
regression analysis. Therefore, these scales will not be discussed further.
Procedure
Participants were brought into the laboratory where they were asked to sign a
consent form. Participants were then provided with the case files. In any given session,
participants were randomly assigned to either the ingroup or outgroup condition and
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therefore received different versions of the case file. Similarly, they were also randomly
assigned to the automatic, control or deliberative conditions.
In the automatic processing condition, participants were told (in a letter attached
to the folder) that the researchers had been asked by other colleagues in the Psychology
Department to conduct one of their studies together with the current study. The
experimenter apologized for the inconvenience. The additional study was presented as a
cognitive psychology experiment on memory. This pseudo-study was used to create
cognitive overload. Participants were asked to memorize and remember a 10-digit
number, while reading the information on the target, and report it immediately before
they started completing the dependent measures. This method is widely used to create
cognitive load. In past studies that use this method participants who did not report at least
the first four digits of the number correctly, were left out of the analysis. Thus, seven
participants who did not follow instructions and were unable to report the first four digits
of the number were removed fi^om the final analysis.
In the deliberative condition, participants were asked to write about their reactions
to the student's behavior (i.e., plagiarism) on a lined page that was provided for reactions,
before completing the dependent measures. They then completed the dependent
measures. In the control condition, participants were not asked to engage in either of
these activities. Once the participants had completed all sections of the study, they were
debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Results
Prior to running the main analysis (a MANOVA with all the main study variables)
an examination of the fairness ratings for the eight punishments was conducted to
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detemiine whether there was a way of appropriately combining the items. A punishment
choice could be judged to be unfair in two ways: either because it was too easy or
because it was too difficult. Averaging across the items failed to provide an accurate
picture of participants' responses. In turn, we looked at the means of the individual items
and found that the first four were seen as unfair because they were too easy and the last
four were seen as unfair because they were too harsh (see Table 1).
Table 1: Means (standard deviations within parenthesis) for items of the fairness ratings
of the punishments choices
Automatic Deliberative Control
No action at all; the student should receive no -2.87 -2.75 -2.25
punishment (.33) (.52) (1.06)
The student should re-write the paper and -2.29 -1.86
-1.75
should only have only the new grade count (0.84) (1.10) (1.16)
The student should re-write paper and the new -1.25 -.62
-.70
grade and an "F" should be averaged (1.10) (1.07) (1.12)
The student should receive an "F' for the paper -.18 .30 .35
(with no opportunity to re-write) (1.21) (.99) (1.17)
The student should fail the course .85 1.12 1.11
(1.18) (1.23) (1.28)
The student should be suspended from school for 1.70 1.98 1.96
a semester (1.32) (1.20) (1.35)
The student should be suspended from school for 2.20 2.37 2.40
a year (1.18) (1.00) (1.36)
The student should be expelled from school and 2.72 2.69 2.54
not be allowed to return (.93) (1.00) (1.36)
Further, a 2 (ingroup, outgroup) X 3 (automatic, deliberative, control) MANOVA
found a main effect of condition on the first four but not on the last four items. Therefore,
the first four items were combined to create a subscale which we called Lenient
Punishment (a = .77) and the last four were combined to create a subscale that we called
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Harsh Punishment (a =
.90). These were used as two measures indicating participants'
ratings of fairness.
A MANOVA for cognitive processing condition and ingroup-outgroup condition
was conducted using the main study variables: Punishment, Behavior, Competence,
Morality, Warmth, Lenient Punishment and Harsh Punishment (correlations between
variables are reported in a correlation matrix, Table 2). It was found that there were no
significant differences by ingroup-outgroup status (Wilks lambda F[7] =
.513, p =
.82);There was also no interaction between cognitive processing condition and ingroup-
out group condition (Wilks lambda, F[14] =
.647, p = .82),
However, the MANOVA revealed there was a significant main effect for
cognitive processing condition (Wilks lambda, F[14] = 316, p = .046). ANOVAs found
significant differences based on cognitive processing condition on the Punishment chosen
(F[2, 198] = 5.8, p= .003) and Lenient Punishment fairness measure (F[2,198] = 6.5, p=
.002). Post hoc (SNK) analyses found that in both cases the deliberative and control
conditions did not differ, but both differed from the automatic condition. In the automatic
condition, Punishment was harsher and Lenient Punishments was rated as more unfair
because these punishments were judged to be too easy on the target (see Table 2)
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Table 2. Means (Standard deviations in parenthesis) for main variables for the automatic,
control and deliberative conditions.
Automatic Deliberative Control F-value P-value
Punishment 4.29 3.83 3.58 5.880 .003
(100) (1.13) (0.97)
Behavior 2.02 2.25 2.33 1.574 .210
(0.89) (0.98) (0.88)
Warmth 4.48 4.55 4.63 .106 .900
(0.84) (1.04) (0.88)
Morality 3.29 3.44 3.29 .460 .632
(1.23) (1.32) (1.27)
Comnefpncp 4 39
.D .941
(1.28) (1.19) (1.09)
Lenient -1.65
-1.23
-1.31 6.5 .002
punishment (0.72) (0.75) (0.81)
Harsh punishment 1.87 2.04 2.00 .9 .408
(1.00) (1.00) (1.08)
On average participants in the automatic condition scored 4.29 and participants in
the deliberative and control condition scored 3.83 and 3.58, respectively. In other words,
those in the automatic condition fell between the student receiving an "F" for the paper
(with no opportunity to re-write) and the student failing the course. However those in the
deliberative and control conditions fell between the student rewriting the paper and
having the new grade and an "F" for the initial paper averaged and the student getting an
"F" for the paper (with no opportunity to rewrite). Furthermore, on a scale from -3 to 3,
with -3 being unfair because the punishments were too lenient, participants in the
automatic condition averaged -1.65, while those in the deliberative condition averaged -
1 .23 and those in the control condition averaged -1.31. Therefore, those in the automatic
condition were harsher in their judgment of the lenient punishments than those in the
control and deliberative conditions, as they saw these punishments to be too lenient on
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the target. Interestingly however, there were no significant condition differences on how
the person was perceived (Warmth, Competence, MoraHty) or how the behavior was
perceived (Behavior).
Although the perceptions of the target and the behavior did not differ by
processing condition or ingroup^utgroup status, they were nevertheless associated with
the punishment variables that differed by condition (see Table 3).
Table 3
:
Correlation matrix for main variables
A B c D E F G
AA Punishment 1
B Lenient punishment -.738** 1
C Harsh punishment -.358** .234** 1
D Behavior -.501** .609** .241** 1
E Competence -208** .243** .140 .664** 1
F Warmth -.244** .268** .162* .695** .707** 1
G Morality _ 44 J * * .463** .221** .620** .130 .190* 1
**- p< .01,*-p< .05
It was found that Competence (r = -.208,p < .01), Morality (r = -.441,p<.01)
and Warmth (r = -.244, p < .01) were all highly related to Punishment suggested (see
Table 2). The less warm, competent and moral the target was perceived, the harsher the
punishment that was recommended. However, when all three measures were entered into
a multiple regression analysis, only judgments of morality predicted the punishment (B =
-.25, SE = .10,p = .013) (See Table 4).
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Table 4: Regression analysis of the effect of the perception of the target on the
recommended punishment.
Beta SE
Competence
.109 .416
Warmth .122
.114
Morality -.246**
.101
All reported betas are unstandardized co-efficients. * p < .05, **p < .001
In addition, correlational analyses showed that the Behavior score was also
significantly associated with Punishment (r = -501
, p < .01), Lenient Punishment (r =
.609, p < .01), Harsh Punishment (r = 241, p < .01),) Competence (r = .664, p < .01),
Warmth (r = .695, p < .01) and Morality (r = .620, p < .01) (see Table 2). When Behavior
was added into a regression analysis predicting punishment, it was found that the
behavior measure was the only significant predictor of the punishment that was suggested
(B = -.338, SE = . 105
, p = .001) (See Table 5).
Table 5: Regression analysis for effect of Competence, Warmth, Morality and Behavior
on the recommended punishment.
Beta SE
Competence .033 .089
Warmth .053 .114
Morality -.269 .107
Behavior -.338** .105
All reported betas are unstandardized co-efficients. * p < .05, **p < .001
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Discussion
In keeping with our hypotheses, participants in the cognitive load (automatic)
condition differed from the control and deliberative conditions in the punishment that
they recommended. Those in the automatic condition suggested a harsher punishment
than did those in the control and deliberative conditions. In keeping with our initial
prediction, participants in all the conditions seemed to agree that plagiarism is wrong. No
group of participants actually suggested that the target should not be punished at all. All
the punishments suggested involved at least rewriting the paper. In addition, in judging
the fairness of the lenient punishments participants in all three conditions averaged well
below the midpoint of the scale, that is, all groups perceived the punishments to be unfair
because they were too lenient. Further, on the first four punishments that were suggested,
which were the most lenient punishments, participants in the automatic condition judged
these as more unfair than participants in the control and deliberative conditions, and this
perceived unfairness reflected a belief that the punishments were too easy on the
transgressing student. As suggested earlier, this finding seems to suggest that participants
in the deliberative and control conditions engaged in effortful processing and in essence
coiTected for their initial response. This could potentially be due to the fact that many
students in the college system are very familiar with plagiarism and therefore engaged in
the post hoc correction.
Also, it is interesting to note that the control condition, which we suggest is the
equivalent of the processing normally used, was more hke the deliberative condition than
the automatic condition. This suggests that moral judgments that we make maybe more
deliberative than the intuitionist model might suggest. At least in the present case in
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which students may have been motivated to perceive the behavior less negatively (given
their familiarity with plagiarism), their controlled response was not the same as their
automatic response. It did not seem to be simply a post hoc explanation of the automatic
reaction ( Haidt, 2001). Instead, it seems to be a post hoc " correction." The differences
that we found between the three conditions seem to point to a process that is similar to
that seen in implicit and explicit attitudes and stereotyping. It seems that while automatic
moral judgments are possible, like implicit attitudes, deliberative processes are likely to
be "natural" as well. This is one area of research that we wish to pursue in order to detect
differences in behavioral outcomes based on these differing processes.
Interestingly, the perceptions of the target and the behavior did not differ across
the conditions. However, how the target was perceived was highly related to the
punishments that were suggested. It is possible that again no difference was detected due
to the fact that participants as college students are familiar with plagiarism. Therefore, the
behavior of the target did not make an impact on the participants. This will have to be
further probed in future studies. However, it was found that when making the judgments
about what punishment the target deserved, both perceived warmth and competence of
the target were not associated with the punishment that was suggested and how lenient or
harsh the punishments were viewed. And the perceived morality of the target was able to
significantly predict what punishment was suggested and how harsh or lenient the
punishments were perceived to be.
The data did not show the presence of an intergroup bias in the manner in which
the target in the ingroup and outgroup conditions was judged. Three possible
explanations come to mind. First, the example of plagiarism that was used in this
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particular study was a very extreme case. In the case that was chosen for this study, the
student had plagiarized almost all of the three pages of the paper that was used as
stimulus material. Perhaps it was extreme enough to override any group sentiments that
the participants felt. Clearly there are certain behaviors that are deemed so immoral that it
may be able to override many of the affiliations we feel. For example, we could argue
that if a person were accused of pedophilia, even if he or she is a member of our group,
we are likely to judge him or her in the same manner we would someone accused of the
same behavior of another group. However, participants' moral judgments were not so
extreme as to provide a great deal of support for this explanation.
Second, as mentioned in the introduction, the intergroup bias effect has generally
not been found in situations that involve punishment (Hewstone et. al., 2002). Therefore,
it is possible that since this was a situation involving punishment the intergroup bias
could not be seen.
Third, it is also plausible that reading the case file of a student who was accused
of plagiarism made the participants' identities as students more salient than their ethnic
identities. This could also be a reason for why we were not able to detect the intergroup
bias in the judgments that the students made. These possible explanations are simply
tentative assumptions and need to be considered in future studies.
The issue of morality in the intergroup context is one that requires further study.
In future research we plan to manipulate group boundaries in a manner that will make use
of the salient student identity vs. an identity of an individual perceived to be outside this
group. Also, we hope to explore the relationship between moral transgressions of
differing levels of intensity and their relationship to intergroup bias.
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In addition, one area that was not explored in this study is the extremity of the
moral transgression. A moral transgression can be extreme in either its 'shock value' or
in the amount ofharm it involves. For example in this particular case of plagiarism,
another person is not directly harmed by the target's behavior. However, we would like to
explore the same variables (cognitive processing and group status) when the situation
involves harm to others. We believe that harm to others might elicit the ingroup-outgroup
differences we hypothesized in this study. This would be in keeping with the findings in
aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), where studies have shown that even
individuals who do not see themselves as prejudiced may nevertheless act in a way that is
prejudicial if they are provided with an 'excuse' for doing so. Therefore, though the
intergroup bias was not found in this research, in a future study that involves harm it
maybe more likely to occur since the harm may provide an 'excuse' for the harsher
treatment of those of the outgroup.
Nevertheless, this study provides a first demonstration of processing differences
in the moral domain, at least with regard to a familiar immoral behavior. Participants
were harsher when providing automatic than controlled responses. Clearly, future
research is needed to explore the generalizability of this finding to other populations and
other transgressions.
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APPENDIX
MATERIAL
Participation in this study entails completion of a questionnaire regarding college life and
some cognitive tasks. The questionnaire and the tasks will take approximately hour to
complete, and you will receive two experimental credits in appreciation of your
participation. There are no risks to participating in this study. Following the collection of
data, your individual identity will be removed from all records and will remain
confidential at all times. Every precaution will be taken to ensure the anonymity of all
data. It is also your right to discontinue your participation in the study at any time
without loss of credit or compensation. (If you have any questions, please contact Ramila
Usoof at 545-0290 or Ronnie Janoff-Bulman at 545-0264. If you have any concerns or
complaints regarding this study, you can contact the Human Subjects Review Board at
545-3428 or at HumanSubjects@ora.umass.edu.)
I agree to participate in this study. My signature below indicates that I have decided to
participate and that I have read and understood the information above.
Print Name Student ID #
Signature Date
We would also like your permission to conduct an experiment in tandem with the present
study, for colleagues in the UMass Psychology Department. Some researchers are
interested in exploring the mechanisms used when humans are required to engage in two
tasks at the same time. Therefore we ask you to please do the following task as you read
the material for the present study:
Memorize the following string of numbers. We will ask you to recall and write it
down at the end of the task.
365129518
It may be difficult to concentrate on the reading as you try to keep the numbers in mind.
Do not be concerned, simply do both tasks together as well as you can.
Thank you for your cooperation.
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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Dear Participant,
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. This is part of a nationwide survey
being conducted by the National Student Integrity Project (NSIP), involving several
universities throughout the United States. The NSIP is interested in exploring attitudes
towards plagiarism and academic honesty among American college students.
You will be provided information from a case in the NSIP database. However, all
identifying information has been removed to protect the privacy of the student. Also, the
case files have been created using selected information and excerpts of the actual material
to allow for the study to be conducted in an efficient manner.
Your views are very important to this project, so please answer the questions as honestly
as possible. Please read through the material that follows. We realize a lot of information
is presented, so it may be difficult to concentrate on all the reading. Simply do the best
you can.
Thank you for your cooperation.
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Dear Student,
Thank you for you help. This folder contains information related to a case of plagiarism.
We would like you to read through the material and provide us with your honest
opinions.
Thefolder consists ofthefollowing information
1
.
The student's personal information
2. Complaint letter from the professor
3. Letter of appeal from the student
4. Excerpts of character references provided on behalf of the student
5. Three pages from the students paper
6. The original Bum's article from which the student plagiarized parts of his paper
Thank you for your participation
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CASE#: EN2354V5
Gender: Male
Race/Ethnicity: Arab-American
Age: 19
Address: ^^HHI^^HI^HII^^IH USA
University: ^^^^HHH^H, USA
Major: Undeclared
Student #: ^^Bl
Year: Freshman
Semester: Spring
Course: ENG 321 (required first year course)
COMPLAINT: Plagiarism. Parts of final paper for ENG 321 copied from already
published work.
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CASE#: EN2354V5
Gender: Male
Race/Ethnicity: White
Age: 19
Address: ^^^HHI^Ij^HI^HI^H' USA
University: USA
Major: Undeclared
Student #: ^^^B
Year: Freshman
Semester: Spring
Course: ENG 321 (required first year course)
COMPLAEVT: Plagiarism. Parts of final paper for ENG 321 copied from already
published work.
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Character References
(Excerptsfrom letters submitted by the student on his behalf)
From:
"I have known since the fall semester of 2003, when he was a student at
the local high school. At that time he began to work in our school as a volunteer tutor for
our students. IH^^HH was in charge of providing students with additional help in
Math and English and was also responsible for helping students complete their homework
after school."
"He was, continually, one of our most responsible, conscientious and hard-working
volunteers, and he earned the respect and trust of the students he worked with. He also
exhibited an ability to work independently."
|, joined the Inter-Community Student Coalition this past fall. He has
since then been an active member of our organization."
"He has worked independently on a number of different projects organized by our group..
His dedication was nowhere more apparent than when we staged a protest march at the
state legislature against proposed tuition increases for our University. His legitimate
anger and frustration over the issue of tuition increases were visible in his passionate yet
constructive efforts to make our protest a success."
"He worked tirelessly to make this event a success, even though he has an extremely busy
schedule. He has shown similar dedication at other events that he has been involved in."
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Character References
(Excerptsfrom letters submitted by the student on his behalf)
From:
Principal
"I have known^^^^^^H since the fall semester of 2003, when he was a student at
the local high school. At that time he began to work in our school as a volunteer tutor for
our students. Hi^^^^HI was in charge of providing students with additional help in
Math and English and was also responsible for helping students complete their homework
after school."
"He was, continually, one of our most responsible, conscientious and hard-working
volunteers, and he earned the respect and trust of the students he worked with. He also
exhibited an ability to work independently."
From:
Inter-Community Student Coalition
"m^mil^mi, joined the Inter-Community Student Coalition this past fall. He has
since then been an active member of our organization."
"He has worked independently on a number of different projects organized by our group..
His dedication was nowhere more apparent than when we staged a protest march at the
state legislature against proposed tuition increases for our University. His legitimate
anger and frustration over the issue of tuition increases were visible in his passionate yet
constructive efforts to make our protest a success."
"He worked tirelessly to make this event a success, even though he has an extremely busy
schedule. He has shown similai- dedication at other events that he has been involved in."
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We are interested in your reactions to what the student did. Using the scales below
please circle the number that best conespondents to how you view the student's
behavior.
Immoral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Moral
Wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good
Unacceptable! 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptabler
Inexcusable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 iLxcusaDie
Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest
Irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Responsible
Uncommon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Common
For each trait listed below, please circle the number that best indicates what you think
about the student in this case.
Not at all Extremelv
Competent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sociable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Well-intentioned 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Skillful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Good-natured 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Moral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Please write down as many of the numbers in order you can remember from the string of
numbers we asked you to memorize at the beginning of this task.
We are interested in your reactions to what the student did. Using the scales below,
please circle the number that best correspondents to how you view the student's
behavior.
Immoral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Moral
Wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VJUUU
Unacceptable! 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable
Inexcusable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Excusable
Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest
Irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Responsible
Uncommon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Common
For each trait listed below, please circle the number that best indicates what you think
about the student in this case.
Not at all Extremelv
Competent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sociable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Well-intentioned 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SkiUful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Good-natured 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Moral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Please check which of the following actions you believe should be taken in this case.
(Check the action you feel is most appropriate.)
no action at all; the student should receive no punishment
the student should re-write the paper and have only this new grade count
the student should re-write the paper and the new grade and an "F' for
initial paper should be averaged
the student should receive an "F" for the paper (with no opportunity to re-write)
the student should fail the course
the student should be suspended from school for a semester
the student should be suspended from school for a year
the student should be expelled from school and not allowed to return
Regardless of your responses above, for each of the actions listed please let us know the
extent to which you think it is fair by indicating below whether you think it is too easy or
too hard on the student. The midpoint (4) of the scale indicates a fair response.
No action at all; the student should receive no punishment
not at all fair- not at all fair-
too easy on the student fair too hard on the student
-3-2-10123
The student should re-write the paper and have only this new grade count
not at all fair- not at all fair-
too easy on the student fair too hard on the student
-3-2-10123
The student should re-write the paper and the new grade and an "F' for
initial paper should be averaged
not at all fair- not at all fair-
too easy on the student fair too hard on the student
-3-2-10123
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The student should receive an "F" for the paper (with no opportunity to re-write)
not at all fair-
too easy on the student fair
-3
-2 -1 0
the student should fail the course
not at all fair-
too easy on the student fair
-3
-2 -1 0 1
not at all fair-
too hai-d on the student
3
not at all fair-
too hard on the student
3
The student should be suspended from school for a semester
not at all fair-
too easy on the student
-3
fair
02-1 12
The student should be suspended from school for a year
not at all fair-
too easy on the student
-3
fair
0-2-1012
The student should be expelled from school and not allowed to return
not at all fair-
too hai d on the student
3
not at all fair-
too hard on the student
3
not at all fair-
too easy on the student
-3 -2
fair
0
not at all fair-
too hard on the student
3
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Please describe in as much detail as possible your reactions to the alleged case of
plagiarism you've just read.
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Demographic questionnaire
1. Gender: Male I. I
Female | |
2. Age:
|
3
.
What ethnic group do you identify with the most? ( Please circle one)
African American Asian American Hispanic
Middle Eastern Native American White
Cape Verdean
Other (specify)
4. What is your reHgion? (Please circle one)
Buddhist Catholicism Christianity
Islam Judaism
Other (specify)
5. How many years of schooling have you completed?
Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior
Other
6. How would your describe your political affiliation?
Democrat Republican Independent
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